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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is twofoldFirst, to estimate, using
structural methods, the extent to which capital flows undermined West
German monetary policy during the Bretton Woods years 1960 to 1970. Arid
second, to show that earlier reduced form estimates of the capital—
account offset coefficient are tainted by simultaneity bias thanks to the
Deutsche Bundesbank's systematic policy of sterilization, and so overestimate
the true coefficient. The paper distinguishes between the short—run or
one—quarter offset coefficient and the long—run coefficient implied by the
full adjustment of all asset markets. An aggregative structural model
German financial markets yields short—run coefficients between .50 and .65
implying substantial Bundesbank control over the monetary base, at least in
the short—run. A formal test for simultaneous—equations bias provides
evidence that variations in domestic credit cannot be regarded as exogenous
and that equations regressing capital flows on changes in domestic credit
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An ability to sterilize or neutralize balance—of—
payments disturbances in theshortrun is a prerequisite
for the effective conduct of monetary policy In an open
economy with fixed exchange rate.Even when assets
denominated in different currencies are imperfect sub-
stitutes, sterilization operations may succeed only
temporarily. But as the Interest sensitivity of inter-
national capital movements Increases, domesIc monetary
policy tends to become powerless. A high degree of
international financial integration entails a powerful
capital—account response to changes in domestic interest
rates and thus substantial volatility in international
reserves.
This essay attempts tO estimate the extent to
which the Integration of the Atlantic community's
financial markets undermined West Germany's ability
to conduct an Independent monetary policy during the
years between 1960 and 1970.1 The pioneers in this
area of empirical research were Argy, Kouri, and Por-
ter, who claimed a 'reduced—form' approach to the
problem would yield clear—cut results while avoiding
1
See Emrnlnger (1977) for a policy—maker's account of
this period.
1the difficulties of structural estimation.2 The re-
duced-form approach has led to a bewildering range of
estimates of the 'offset coefficient', which measures
the fraction of any domestic monetary expansion offset
by capital outflow during the same quarter. Table 1
presents a sample of these estimates, which range from
roughly 50 percent to almost 90 percent.
With the exception of the Argy—Kouri study ——
which,significantly, yields the lowest offset esti-
mate ——thesereduced—form studies treat domestic mone-
tary policy as an exogenous determinant of capital move-
ments. They thus ignore the negative correlation
between changes in the Bundesbank's domestic andfor—
eign assets arising through systematic sterilization
operations, andsointroduce a potential simultaneous—
equations bias into their results. These suspicions
appear to be confirmed by a detailed econometric model
of the West German financial sector constructed by
Herring and Marston (1977). Simulation of the Herring—
Marston model indicates an offset coefficient similar
2Their work includes Porter (1972), Argy and Kouri
(l971), Kouri and Porter(19714), and Kouri (1975).
•The seminal paper by Whims (1971) sparked much of




Estimates of the Offset Coefficient for West Germany
Offset
Author Period Dependent Variable Coefficiert
Argy and 1963:111 Total capital flows 0.147
Kouri (l974)—1970:IV (0.214)
Kouri and 1960:1—Total capital flows 0.77
Porter (19714) 1970:IV (0.014)
Kouri and 1960:1—Short—term capital 0.77
Porter (19714) 1970:IVflows (0.05)
Kouri (1975) 1960:1—Total capital flows 0.70
1972:11 (0.014)
Neumann 1960:1—Total capital flows 0.88
(1978) 1972:11 (0.06)
Neumann 1961:111 Short—term capital 0.53'
(1978) —1968:11 flows
*
Standarderror not reported.to those found by Kouri and Porter (1971k). But the
Herring—Marston offset coefficient is a long—run co-
efficient: because asset markets adjust gradually, the
capital—account response to monetary policy is drawn
out over a period of sixteen quarters. These findings
suggest that the simultaneity bias in the Kouri—Porter
approach exaggerates the magnitude of the one—quarter
or short—run offset.
This essay presents additional evidence that the
degree to which the monetary measures of the German
Bundesbank were undermined by interest—sensitive capital
movements during the years 1960—1970 is much smaller
than the reduced—form estimates suggest. We distin—
guish below between the short—run offset coefficient,
which measures the reserve loss associated with a
monetary expansion in the same and the long—
run offset coefficient, which applies only after asset
markets have adjusted fully to the monetary disturb-
ance. While the exact values of the offset coeffici-
ents vary from quarter to quarter because of changes in
banks' reserve requirements, we find the typical short—
run offset coefficient to be between .10 and .15, with
the typical long—run offset between .50 and .65. The
offsets are derived from a small quarterly econometric
model, and are consistent with the findings of Herring
and Marston (1977). They imply that the Bundesbank
'4.exercised substantial control over the Germanmoney
stock during the Bretton Woods period, at least inthe
short run.
Section I presents a highly aggregative model of
the financial sector of a smallopen economy with
fixed exchange rate whose bonds are imperfect substi-
tutes for foreign—currency bonds in asset—holders'
portfolios. We derive three structural equations
determining equilibrium values of the domestic interest
rate, the money stock, and the stockof net external
liabilities. The approach differs from that ofHerring
and Narston in that the structure of our model (in-
cluding the lag structure) is simple enough to allow
explicit calculation of short— and long—run offsets.
Section II closes the model by recognizing that
the central bank's monetary policy isendogenous. We
pecify and estimate a monetary policy reaction func-
tion which confirms previous findings that theBundes—
bank consistently sterilized changes in itsforeign
assets. Our measure of the impact of changes inre-
serve requirements on the monetary base is different
from the measure proposed by Porter (1972)and used in
all of the subsequent literature.
Section III presents the results ofestimating the
asset—demand equations, together with theimplied short—
run and long—run offset coefficients. Theseare corn—
5.6
putedasthe equilibrium response of the stock of net
external liabilities to a change in the domestic assets
ofthe Bundesbank, using first short—run andthen long—
runelasticities. As mentioned above, the short—run
coefficientsare much smaller than anyappearing in the
existingliterature on offsetting capital movements.
In Section IV weundertakea direct examination
of the Kouri—Porter approach for the presence of sim-
ultaneity bias, first showing that such a. bias always
increases the estimated offset. Using a test suggested
by Hausinan (1978), we find that we can reject the hypo-
thesisthat monetary policy is exogenous in equations
explaining total and short—term capital flows. This
findinglends support to the offset figures computed
in Section III.
Section V offers concluding remarks. In addition,
there are two appendices. Appendix I derives the
asymptotic bias in the reduced—foi'm approach, while
Appendix II describes the data series used in estimation.I. A Model' of the West German Financial Sector
This section presents a highly aggregative model
of financial asset markets in a small, open economy
with a fixed exchange rate. The model differs from
that of Kouri and Porter (19714) only in allowing for
a domestic banking system.3 By postulating gradual
adjustment of asset stocks to desired levels ——aform-
ulation that does not preclude instantaneous portfolio
equilibrium ——wederive structural equations suitable
for estimation.
The main building blocks are the domestic money
market and a market in internationally-traded, interest—
bearing claims. These markets jointly determine equi-
librium values of the money stock, the domestic interest
rate, and the stock of net liabilities vis—à—vis the
rest of the world. The description of the central
bank's policy reaction function, needed to close the
model, is taken up in the next section.
A. The International Bond Market
We assume that capital is imperfectly mobile, in
the sense that bonds denominated in domesticcurrency
(Deutsche Marks) and bonds denominated in foreign
The present model is nearly identical to one of
Dornbusch (1977).
7currency (dollars) are imperfect substitutes. The
* interestrate on dollar—denominated bonds is r,and
tsexogenous to the West German economy. Foreign
residents' long—run desired holdings of D-Mark denom—
*** matedbonds are a function F(r,r ,Y ,v)ofrates of
* * * return(r andr),income(Y ),andwealth(V ).Here,
r is the domestic bond rate; the function F is expressed
in dollar terms. Likewise, domestic residents' de-
sired holdings of dollar assets, in D—Mark terms,
* isa function H(r,r ,Y,v) of interest rates, domestic
income (Y), and domestic financial wealth (V). The
long—run equilibrium level of net external liabilities,
in terms of D-Marks, can be expressed as
*** *
NEL=sF(r,r,Y ,V )— H(r,r,Y,V) (1)
where S is the D—Mark/dollar spot exchange rate.
Capital flows arise as changes in the stock of net
external liabilities.
We adopt the assumption that asset—holders
abroad and at home adjust their holdings of foreign
assets toward their long—run equilibrium levels at the
same rate A, so that if F and H denote actual —-as
opposed to desired ——assetholdings, we have
F —F1
=A(F—F1),
8H H1 =xdT — H1)
These, together with (1), imply the relation
NEL =X(sF-.+ (1-
X9NEL1. (2)
Linearizing (2), we obtain our structural equation for







Inthis specification, E represents a set of dummy
variables corresponding to the speculative episodes
of 1968:IV— 1969:IV, while foreign income and wealth
have been dropped because of non—availability of data.
Portfolio theory predicts thata2
>0,for a
rise in domestic interest rates leads to a capital
inflow ——anincrease in net foreign liabilities.
Similarly, an increase in the foreign rate induces
asset—holders to augment their holdings of dollar—
denominated bonds, andso a3 <0.A rise in nominal
income increases the transactions demand for money,
and NEL rises as foreign assets are sold off to meet
this demand, so that
a5




The monetary sector is described by a money
dertand equation and a money supply equation.
The money demand equation, assumes that long—run
desired real money holdings N/P are a function of the
domestic interest rate, real income, and real wealth:
(r,Y/P,V/P) . (1)
P is taken to be the consumer price index. Denoting
deflated nominal variables by lower—case letters, we
assume that wealth owners adjust actual real balances
to desired real balances according to the partial ad-
justment rule
m-m1=y(m—rn1)






which is similar to the one adopted by Modigliani,
Rasche, and Cooper (1970) in their study of money
demand in the U.S. Our expectation is thatb2 <0,
h3 and b >0,and b5 =1—y>0.
C. Money Supply
Turning to the supply side, we hypothesize thatthe banking system's long—run desired money supply can
be written as a function of the difference between the
domestic interest rate and the central bank discount
rateand the real monetary base, BA/P:
=U(r_,BA/P)
As explained in the next section, we work in this
paper with a monetary base series BA adjusted to
reflect changes in reserve requirements. This allows
us to avoid explicit consideration of the deposit
multiplier.
As before, we assume banks adjust themoney supply
toward its long—run equilibrium level according to the
rule
m — = — m1) . (6)












II.TheReaction ?un'ctioi of the Montarr Authori
This sectiondescribes and estimates a monetary
policy reaction function for the Bundesbank. The non—
exogeneity of Bundesbank monetary policy was recog—
nized in the original work on sterilization by Argy
and Kouri (1971fl, but essentially ignored in subsequent
work by Kouri and Porter (197'4), Kouri (1975), Kohl—
hagen (1977),Neumann(1978), and others. Obviously,
knowledge of the German monetary authority's, behavior
during the 1960s, and its role in the breakdown of the
BrettonWoodssystem, is useful in itself. But there
is also the econometric issue that parameter estimates
for models of the West German financial sector will in
general be inconsistent if monetary policy is falsely
taken to be exogenous.
Following Argy and Kouri (l97) and Herring and
1arston (1977), we take the position that Bundesbank
monetary policy can be modelled as a function of a
small number of targets, internal and external. In
view of the large number of instruments available to
the central bank ——minimumreserve policy, discount
policy, open market policy, and others ——amajor ob—
stacle to estimation of such a function is the defin-
ition of a sufficiently comprehensive numerical measure
of monetary policy to serve as the dependent varia—1.3
ble.hI Thisessay proposes ameasure of monetary pol-
icy different from the one prevalent in the literature
on neutralization and offsetting capital flows.5
Because of its limited holdings of domestic debt.
the Bundesbank, during the period of this study, used
changes in reserve requi.'ements as its primary instru-
ment of monetary control. Direct changes in the domes-
tic assets of thecentralbank, including changes in
the volume of discounting and the level of official
deposits, played only secondary roles. For this reason,
empirical studies of Bundesbank policy have always
recognized the need for a measure of the impact of
required reserve changes on the money supply.
Porter (1972), who initiated the empirical study
of offsetting capital movements, approached the problem
by asking what increase in the foreign assets of the
central bank would have to occur after an increase in
reserve requirements to completely offset that policy's
On Bundesbank policy, see Schlesinger and Bockelmann
(1973) and Organisation for Economic Co—operation and
Development (1973). The latter contains an excellent
chronology of central bank monetary measures during
the period under study here.
The problems raised by capital controls, 100 percent
reserve requirements on foreign deposits, and similar
measures are discussed in the next section.impact on the money stock. Neglecting the influence
of the currency—deposit ratio, we need only find LB
such that
B+AB
where ct is the new required reserve ratio. If D =
B/a1is the level of deposits before the change in
the reserve ratio, we can write AB as the change in
required reserves, (a —a1)D.This is the measure
of monetary policy that has been used in subsequent
work in this area, and is surel' the right one if
one's goal is to calculate a summary, reduced—form
offset coefficient.
But it is harder to argue that monetary policy—
makers think in these terms, and that this measure
of the magnitude of minimum reserve policy therefore
belongs on the left—hand side of a reaction function.
Policy-makers are more likely to ask what change in
the monetary base, given the existing reserve ratio,
is equivalent in its impact on the money supply to a
contemplated change in reserve requirements. Neglect-
ing currency once again, the change in the base, AB,
equivalent to a change in the reserve ratio froma1
to a is given by
1LlB+B B
orEiB =[(a1/cL)—l]B.We adopt this as our measure
of the change in monetary policy associated with a
change in required reserves.
In applying this measure, weare,in effect,
systematically redefining the base each period so as
to hold reserve requirements constant at their initial
level, c. Let DACB denote the net domestic assets of
the central bank, FACB its net foreign assets, and
let =a0/a1.We define the adjusted base BA
——thatis, the monetary base adjusted to reflect the
assumption of a constant required reserve ratio ——
by
BAt BAt1 + FACBt + ' (8)
where =Bt
+Ot1ADACBt.tMP is just the policy-
induced change in the adjusted base, and is taken to
be the dependent variable in the Bundesbank's reaction
function.6 We note thatFACB =ANEL+CAB,where CAB
6
Like all other variables, the base is measured at the
end of each quarter. Since reserve requirementchanges
are announced at the beginning of each month, we take
to be the average reserve requirement announced in the
last month of each quarter in the actual estimation.
Note that ]Bt =Etl—1]Bt,
where Bt is the unadjusted base.
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Is the current—account balance.
We hypothesize that the reaction function has the
form




+ d6Stl + ,
whereP and 0 are the quarter—to—quarter percentage
changes in the price level and manufacturing orders,
respectively, and Si and 311 are seasonal dummies for
the first and fourth quarters. The coefficient d2
Is the sterilization coefficient, which measures the
extent to which the Bundesbank attempts to neutralize
the money creation resulting from its foreign exchange
intervention through countervailing domestic monetary
measures.7 The price and activity variables are in-
tended to capture the influence of domestic cyclical
factors on monetary policy, and their coefficients
should be negative.
During much of the period with which wedeal,
the Bundesbank offered domestic banks forward cover at
preferential rates as an inducement to hold foreign
Of course, d2 <0when a policy of sterilization is
pursued. A positive value of d2 would he evidence of
a monetary policy aimed at external ——ratherthan in-
ternal ——balance.rather than domestic assets. These forwardswap arrange-
ments were a useful tool from the standpoint of domes-
tic monetary control, for by increasing the levelof
swap contracts outstanding, the Bundesbank was able to
bring about a decrease in its net foreign assets.8 Be-
cause these swaps assumed massive proportions relative
to the monetary base in some quarters,they must be
included in any assessment of central bankpolicy.
While the Bundesbank quotedswapratesrather than
directly choosing a desired volume of swap contracts,
we assume that, during the course of any quarter, it
was able to vary the swap rate so as to elicit the
desired quantitative response from domestic banks.
Thisallows us to redefine our measure 1MP ofmonetary
policy as the sum of reserve requirement changes,
changesin the Bundesbank's net domestic assetholdings,




Recognition that the swaps are a policy—inducedcomponent
of net external liabilities entailsan adjustmentof
thatseries. We accomplish this adjustmentby redefin—
8Fora discussion of swap policy, see Brehmer (1961!).
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ing NELasthe sumoftotal net external liabilities
andoutstandingswap commitments of the centralbank
at the end of each quarter.
Taking the current account CAB to be exogenous
and using it as an instrument for FACB, we obtain the
following estimate of the reaction function (9)over
£








All coefficients have the expected signs. The equation
provides strong evidence that the Bundesbank pursued
a policy of systematic sterilization; the estimated
sterilization coefficient is not significantly differ-
ent from —1. The implication is that monetary policy
is indeedeni3.ogenous, and should be treated as such in
econometric estimation.III. The Offset to Monetary Policy
This section presents estimates of the three asset—
demand equations described in Section I, and uses them
to calculate the offset to monetary policy in the short-
run and in the long run. All equations are estimated
by two—stage least squares. We assume that changes in
real variables have an immediate impact on financial
markets, but that financial disturbances influence the
level of economic activity only after some time has
elapsed. We thus assume that income, the price level,
wealth, andthecurrent—account balance may be used as
instruments. In addition, we use as instruments the
foreign interest rate, the central-bank discount rate,
the exogenous variables In the policy reaction func-
tion, GOVDEP (the level of government deposits at the
J3undesbank), and GOVMON(governmentholdings of money
M2). The data series are described In detail in Appen-
dix II.
Our period of estimation is 1960:1 to l970:IV.
Although the exchange value of the Deutsche Mark was
pegged in 1971:1 and again between the Smithsonian re-
alignment of December 1971 and the crisis of February—
March 1973, the starting point of the currentperiod of
managed floating, there seemed to be little to gain from
including this particularly turbulent period in our sam—
1920
pie.
We discuss each equation in turn.9
A. Net External Liabilities
We obtin the following estimate of the equation
explaining net external liabili,ties:
NEL/P =6.5140+0.8'42r —1.556r* +
(3.039)(0.371) (0.659)
0.0214 Y/P +0.888NEL 1/P+
(0.011) (0.067)






Theh-statistic of Durbin wasusedto test for first—
order serial correlation. While the asymptotic distri-
bution of h is not standard normal in a simultaneous—
equations context, itcanbe shown(seeGodfrey (1978))
that ifall instrumentsare exogenous, h is asymptotic-
allynormal with variance exceeding 1. Thismeans that
if we treat h as N(0,l), we are more likely to reject
the hypothesis of no serial correlation. Lagged endo—
genous variables were not usedasinstruments to obtain
the estimates of this section; as a precaution against
more complicated forms of time—dependence in the equation
residuals. In allthreecases the h—statistic wasless
than 1 in absolute value, giving no grounds for reject—
ing the hypothesis of no first—order serial correlation.Note that nominal variables have been deflated by the
price level. The .variables Di Ci. =l,...,5)are dummies
for each of the five turbulent quarters 1968:IV —
l969:IV.As explained in the previous section, NEL
has been corrected for forward swap commitments of the
BLindesbank.
The parameter estimates for thi equation support
the portfolio—balance theory. Only the coefficient of
wealth was insignificantly different from zero, leading
us to exclude it from the equation. The other coeffi-
cients are significant at the 5 percent level and are
correctly signed.
A striking feature of the equation is the signifi-
cant positive coefficient of income, indicating that a
DM 1 billion rise in income (at an annual rate) leads
German asset owners to repatriate DM 24 million to
satisfy their increased desire for real balances. The
lagged endogenous variable has a high coefficient,
implying a rather slow adjustment speed of only about
11 percent per quarter.
The aggregate measure of monetary policy appearing
on the left—hand side of the reaction function in (9)
does not account for the effects of the sharper policy
weapons deployed in an effort to discourage capital in-
flows rather than offset their effects on the money
supply. The chief omissions are the high (at times 100
2122
percent) marginal reserve requirements imposed on for-
eign—owned deposits and prohibitions on interest pay-
ments to foreigners.
Our justification for ignoring these measures i.n
the equation for net external liabilities is that they
10 could be, and in fact were, circumvented quite easily.
Thus, at the level of aggregation we have adopted, we
would expect their effects to he negligible. This view
is supported by a recent study on German capital controls
by flewson and Sakakibara (1977).
B. Money Demand
The money demand equation uses 142 as dependnt var-
iable.. Two—stage least squares yields the estimate:
10For example, Hewson and Sakakibara (1977) point out
that'A typical approach to cirurnventing the minimum
reserve requirementwas that German banks would transfer
loan business vis—a—vis German residents to the books of
their foreign branches. As a result German (nonbank)
residents would incur liabilities to the foreign branches
of German banks, and since neither these foreign branches
(which, legally are classified as nonresidents) nor dom-
estic nonhank customers were subject to the minimum re-
serve requirement, German banks were able to circumvent
the control without any loss of business. The notable
expansion of the foreign branch activities of German
banksthroughout this period suggests thewidespread
use of this loophole.' The loophole was closed only
in 1972 when minimum reserve requirements were imposed






The coefficient of the domestic interest rate,
while having the correct sign, is small and insignifi-
cant at the 5percentlevel. This is probably due to
the fact that M2 contains some interest—bearing assets.
Both real income and real wealth have highly sig-
nificant positive coefficients, however. As we would
expect, an increase in either of these variables raises
the demand for real cash balances. The speed of adjust—
ment is roughly 50 percent per quarter, quite rapidby
the standards of quarterly money demand equations.
C. Money Supply
The estimated money supply equation is







The estimated coefficients for this equation have
the signs predicted by theory. An increase in the dom—
estic interbank rate increases money supply, while an
Increase in the Bundesbank discount rate causes banks
to restrict lending. A rise in the adjusted base, of
course, leads to an expansion of the money supply.
However, the coefficient of lagged money is prob-
ably too high: the implied speed of adjustment of the
money supply to Its long—run equilibrium level is only
about 10 percent per quarter, far too low to be believ-
able.
D. Offset oefficients
We now use the simple econometric model we have
estimated to derive the short— and long—run offsets to
monetary policy. This is done by computing the total
derivative of the stock of net external liabilities,
NEL, with respect to DACB, the net domestic assets of
the Bundesbank. In computing the long-run offset coeffi-
cients, weuse the long—run derivatives implied by the
assetdemandequationst speeds of adjustment to steady—
state equilibrium.
Differentiating the system consisting of equations
(3),(5), (7), andthe identity25
BA =.e(FACB+ DACB)








The capital outflow resulting from anopen market pur—
chase is just equal to the resulting decrease In net
external liabilities. Thus, —dNEL/dDACB is precisely
the short—run offset coefficient. We see that It will
not be the same in each quarter, for It depends on the
level of reserve requirements. The offset becomescorn—
plete, of course, as a2, which measures the Interest—
sensitivity of capital movements, becomes infinite.11
To compute the long—run offset, we replace the
short—run derivatives in the above expression with the
corresponding long—run derivatives
a2a2/(l—a7),
b2/(l-b5), C2= c2/(l-c),and =c3/(l-c).The
two sets of offset coefficients arereported in Tables
2a and 2b.
The short—run offset coefficients areremarkably
small when compared with those appearing In the liter-
ature and generally accepted. The highest isonly 15.5
percent, implying that the Bundesbank had to purchase
Note that the offset is also complete whenb2 =C2 = 0.
Thus a unit offset Is in theory consistent
with full central—bank control over the domesticInterest rate.26
Table2a
Short—Run Offset Coefficients
1960 I 0.078 1965 III 0.102
1960 II 0.072 1965 IV 0.106
1960 III 0.070 1966 I 0.103
1960 IV 0.072 1966 II 0.103
1961 I 0.080 1966 III o.io
1961 II 0.089 1966 IV 0.109
1961 III 0.100 1967 I 0.120
1961 IV 0.106 1967 II 0.126
1962 I 0.109 1967 III 0.152
1962 II 0.109 1967 IV 0.152
1962 III 0.109 1968 I 0.152
1962 IV 0.109 1968 II 0.152
1963 I 0.110 1968 III 0.155
1963 II 0.110 1968 IV 0.143
1963III 0.110 1969 I 0.i48
1963 IV 0.110 1969 II 0.123
1964I 0.111 1969 III 0.118
196II 0.110 1969 IV 0.143
l964III 0.101 1970 I 0.133
19614 IV 0.101 1970 II 0.131
1965I 0.102 1970 III 0.1014
1965 II 0.102 1970 IV 0.102Table 2b
Long—Run Offset Coefficients
27
1960I 0.148 1965III 0.520
1960II 0.1425 1965IV 0.532
1960III 0.1119 1966I 0.523
1960IV 0.1425 1966II 0.523
1961I 0.1453 1966III 0.526
1961II 0.1181 1966Iv 0.538




1962I 0.538 1967III 0.632
1962II 0.538 1967IV 0.632
1962III 0.538 1968I 0.632
1962IV 0.538 1968II 0.632
1963I 0.5112 1968III 0.636
1963II 0.5112 1968Iv 0.615
1963III 0.5142 1969I 0.623
1963IV 0.5142 1969II 0.572
19614I o.514 1969III 0.562
19611II 0.542 1969IV 0.615
196'lIII 0.517 1970I 0.595
19614IV 0.517 1970II 0.591
1965I 0.520 1970III 0.526
1965II 0.520 1970IV 0.520DM 1.18 billion in domestic assets to increase the base
by DM 1 billion in that quarter. As asset markets are
given time to adjust, however, the offset increases:
the long—run coefficients reported in Table 2b are sub-
stantial. The highest, 63.6 percent, implies that an
open market purchase of DM 2.75 billion was required to
bring about a permanent DM 1 billion increase in the
monetary base. In general, the long—run offset figures
are somewhat lower, in the neighborhood of 50 to 55 per-
cent.
The results reported here suggest that the Bundes—
bank had ample leeway to conduct an independent mone-
tary policy over a short horizon during the Bretton
Woods period. In the long run, the cost of an indepen—
dent policy, measured in terms of reserve volatility,
appears to have been greater. But our findings indicate
the short—term constraints were not nearly as severe
as suggested by reduced—form estimates of the offset
coefficient.
2829
IV. 3imultafleitY. asand the
Although the long—runoffset coefficient implied
by the simplestructural model estimatedin the previous
section is substantial,the implied short—runoffset
coefficient is very smallcompared to those reportedin
Table 1. How can weexplain the enormousdiscrepanCY
between our resultsand those obtainedthrough the re-
duced—form method? Weshall argue in thissection that
existing estimates ofthe reduced—form offsetcoefficient
for Germany, particularlYthose presented byKouri and
Porter (l97) andKouri (1975), reflect inlarge part
the correlation betweenmonetary policy and capital
flows arising from thesterilization policies ofthe
central bank rather thanthe true capital_account
response to domesticmonetary policy. Thisreasoning
Is borne out by a formaltest for simultaneitY bias.
Returning to the notationof Section I, we follow
Kouri and Porter and expresstotal capital flows as
** * *
TCF stF(r,r ,Y ,V )— H(r,r,Y,V) (11)
where adjustment lagshave been ignored.bstractiflg
from the money supply process,we can express thedom-
estic interest rate rin terms of exogenousvariables
and the monetary base.This allows us to write the
capital—flow equationin 'reduced form' as30
TCF =
a1+ a2Ar* +a3.Y + aLMP +
a5CAB + + a7AE + u
where LMP Is now thechange in monetary policydefined
In Porter's (1972)sense as the increase in theBundes—
bank's net domesticassets minus the increasein re-
quired reserves, SI is theseasonal dummy for the fourth
quarter, and speculative
exchange_rate expectations E
are represented byexogenous dummy vriable. (Wealth
and foreign Incomevariables are dropped.)
The problem with thisequation Is that It contains
AMP, which, as we have
seen, Is endogenous, thanks tothe
central bank's sterilizationpolicies. In otherwords,
there exists a reactionfunction having the form
LMP (TCF + CAB) + AZ +v
where the variables Zare exogenous targets ofmonetary
policy. This raises the issueof •the consistency of
the ordinary leastsquares estimator, which isused by
Kouri and Porter toestimate the capital_flowequation.
But it also raises theissue ofidentifiability, for
the capital_flowequation will be unidentifiedunless
differs significantly fromzero. We should not betoo
complacent on thisscore, for the evidence, bothsta-
tistical andanecdotal, indicates that whilethe Budes..bank's response to foreign money inflows was stable
and strong, its response to cyclical developments was
weaker and more erratic.
Assuming identification, we turn to the question of
bias. Denoting the offset coefficient bya, we can
write the capital—flow 'reduced form' as TCF =ctE]'4P+








small when the influence of theexogenous targets Z on
monetary policy is weak. On the assumption that Q is
indeed small and that the unexplainedvolatility of
capital movements Is much greater that that ofmonetary
policy (so that >> ci),we see that plim aOLS
a+1/f —a=1/a.If, as our evidence indicates,
sterilization is complete, the OLS estimate of the
offset coefficient will be biased toward —lwhen the
variance of u Is high, and will thus reflectthe behav—
br of the central bank rather than that ofprivate
asset—holders.
12
Formula (12) is derived in Appendix I. Note that the
condition E[u'v] =0guarantees the identifiability of the
reduced—orin capital—flow equation's parameters.
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Kouriand Porter argue that a reduction in the OLS
bias can be achieved through addition to the equation of
the expectational dummy variables, which assume non—zero
values during speculative episodes when the reduced form
predicts badly. This argument makes little sense, for
while addition of dummies reduces the sample variance,
the probability limit in (12) is calculated on the
assumption of homoscedastic errors. To see whether the
dummies do reduce the bias in the offset coefficient,
we have estimated Kouri—Porter capital flow:equations
with and without dummy variables over our sample period,
1960:1 to 1970:IV. In Table 3 we present results of
estimation for both the total capital—flow equation (11)
and the short—term capital—flow (STCF) equation ex-
plaining international loans maturing in less than a
year; the latter differs from (ii) on1yin that CABLTC,
the sum of the current account and the long—term capital
account, replaces CAB on the right—hand side.'3 The
estimated offset coefficients in both sets of equations
are very close --—inthe neighborhood of 1 for the capi-
tal account as a whole and near .9 for short—term flows.
13Of course, treatment of the long—term capital account
as exogenous in the eguation for short—term capital move-
ments introduces another possible source of simultaneity
bias. We return to this issue below. Equations in Table
3 have been corrected for a first—order moving average

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Any reduction in bias is quite small.
it is possible, however, to make a convincing ar-
gument that the observations corresponding to specula-
tive attacks are Toutlierst that play a large part in
worsening the OLS bias. The simplest waytosee if
this is so is to drop the speculative periods from the
sample. Rows (a) and (b) of Tablereport the results
of estimating the total and short—term capital—flow
equations over the tranquil sub—period 1961:111 to
1967:IV; they show that the observations from turbulent
quartersdo exert a preponderant influence on the esti-
mated offset. The latter declines from nearly 100 per-
cent to55 percent for the TCF equation, and from
90 percent to L16 percent for the STCF equation. For the
policy maker, the difference could not be more striking.
In view of this large discrepancy, it hardly seems rea-
sonable to take the view that the normal interest re-
sponse of capital flows during th Bretton Woods period
entailed a nearly complete offset to domestic monetary
policy.
Of course, even these lower short—run offsets are
much higher than those calculated in the previous
section. But they are still biased if sterilization is
systematic. To get some idea of the degree of bias, we
estimate the 'reduced form' over the period 1961:111 to














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 reaction function estimated above. The results appear
in Rows (c) and (d) of Table !.Thecoefficient of AMP
in the total capital—flow equation is nowslightlyposi-
tive and not significantly different from zero. The
estimated offset in the short—term capital flow equation
falls to 26.3 percent, but the 2SLS variance is so high
that the coefficient is not significant. 2SLS estimation
thus seems to indicate that some simultaneity bias is
still present.
We can test for the presence of such a bias using
the specification test suggested by Hausman (1978). The
basic idea of the test is to compare the difference be-
tweenthe OLSestimate of the capital—flow equa—
tion's parameters, which isefficient under the null
hypothesisof no simultaneity bias, and the 2SLS esti-
mator b2SLS, which is consistent in the presence of
simultaneity bias but inefficient when the null hypo-
thesis is true. The appropriate metric for inference
is given by the test statistic
(2SLS_OLS)'[var(62SLS)_var(OLS)1 (2SL3bOLS)
which is distributed asymptotically x2(6) under the
null hypothesis.
Computation of this statistic would be laborious,
but fortunately a simpler method of implementing the37.
simultaneitYtest is available.Consider an equation
y = + X2y+i
wherethe are known to beuncorrelated with the
error iibutthe X1 may becorrelated. If Qisa set of
instrumentsforX1 and
Q(QIQ)1QtX1, we use OLS




AsHausman (1978) showS,the standard F—testof the
hypothesis ct =0is also the test forsimultaneity bias.
We employ the secondform of the Hausmarltest to
test for the.preseflceof bias
in the OLS estimatesof the capital—flowreduced formst
The results appear asequations (a) and(b) of Table 5,
where we have simplyadded to the capital-flowequations
1MP, the projectionof MP onto the spacespanned by
the instruments. The coefficient ofL1IP in equation
(a) is significant,and so the hypothesisof no simul-
taneity bias can berejected. In equation(b), however,
we cannot findevidence of bias.
Again, the instrumentsare the right—handside var-
iables of the capital—fl0''
equations other thanMP as
well as the exogenous policy




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 This apparent contradiction disappears when we
notice that we have used CABLTC as an instrument in
equation (b), in accordance with the common practice
of regardinglong—term capital flows as exogenousin
estimatingoffsetcoefficients. But there are no
goodgrounds to believe this is a valid assumption.
Sincewe have CAB available as an instrument, we can
use it instead of CABLTC to form the instrumental var-
iable estimate of the short-term capital—flow equa-
tion's parameters. The result is
STCF 0.179 —0.389 Lr —0.032Y +
(0.3l)(0.6'41) (O.o8)




which is very different from equations (b) and (d) of
Table .Thisshift in the coefficients suggests that
long-term capital flows are indeed endogenous, and that
our previous test for the endogeneity of AMPin the
short—termcapital—flow equation was invalid. Weob—
•
tam a valid test by adding CABLTC as well as AMP to
this equation's regressors and applying OLS. The result,
reported in Row (c) •of Table 5, provides unambiguous
39evidence of simultaneity bias: the sum of squared re—
siduals of equation (b) of Table 14 is 5.023, while that
of equation (c) of Table 5isonly 1.839. We therefore
can reject the joint hypothesis that both monetary policy
andlong—termcapital flows are exogenous.
When examined carefully, the conclusions of the
Treducedformt approach to capital movements provide
no grounds for rejecting the offset coefficients implied
by structural estimates. This section's evidence is
consistentwith the viewthat the reduced—formapproach
isamisleading short—cut, and that the offset coeffi—
dents it yieldsareseriouslybiased. However, the
structural approach taken in this essay avoids the prob—
lems of the Kouri—Porter method. Although structural
estimation is more roundabout and certainly more diffi-
cult, it is probably the only way to obtain a reliable
answer to the offset question.V. Conclusion
This essay presented a small econometric model of
the West German financial sector and used its parameters
to calculate the short—run arid long—run offsets to mone-
tary policy due to interest—sensitive capital movements.
The resulting series of short—run offset.coefficients
suggested that the offset over.one quarter was quite
small during the 1960—1970 period, typically between 10
and 15 percent. The long—run offset, based on full ad-
justment of asset markets, was found to be quite large,
however, indicating an ultimate reserve loss of between
500 and 650 million Deutsche Marks for every DM1bill-
ion increase in the domestic source component of the
monetary base. It therefore appears that the Bundes—
bank's conduct of monetary policy was relatively un-
hampered by international reserve volatility on a quart-
erly basis, at least during periods of tranquility In
international financial markets. Only over a horizon
of several quarters did monetary policy entail large
reserve losses. But, thanks to a substantial degree
of Imperfect substitutability between DM-andforeign—
currency—denominated bonds, these losses did not suffice
to render monetary measures ineffective in thelong run.
While consistent with the simulation results of
Herring and Marston's (1977) more elaborate model, our
1P1l'2
findingscontradict those of the popular 'reduced—form'
approach to measuring the short-run offset, which typ-
ically yields estimates ranging from 50 to 90 percent.
This essay suggested that these estimates pick up the
correlation between monetary policy and capital flows
resulting from the Bundesbank's sterilization operations,
and do not measure the capital—account response to mone-
tary policy. Formal statistical tests allowed us to
reject the hypothesis that monetary policy can be
treated as exogenous in the estimation of capital—flow
equations. In addition, we found that it is improper
to assume that long—term capital flows are exogenous in
equations explaining short—term flows.
Or estimated offset figures must be interpreted
with caution because of the imprecision of the under-
lying parameter estimates. In addition, wemustrecog-
nize that periods ofheavy speculationagains the
existingexchange parities posed special problems for
the Bundesbank. Our results do not imply the contrary.
Wehave made no attempt to explain exchange—rate expec-
tations or their connection with domestic monetary
policy, and our offset coefficients measure the re—
SpOflSIVCnCSS ofcapitalflos to interest—rate changes
only. Theyarecalculated onthe assumption that ex-
pectationscan be held constant ——abad assumption
during periods of turbulencein world financial markets.Appendix I: Sterilization and Simultaneity Bias'5
In this appendix we consider the consequences of
estimating cx by ordinary least squares in the simul—
taneous system
= + Xy+u
where X and Z are exogenous. This is of course the
situation that arises when the capital account and
monetary TJolicy are simultaneously determined by the
capital—flow and sterilization equations
TCF =czAMP+LXy+u,
tMP =TCF+AZ+v
and a is the offset coefficient. (Here, —l <a,<0.)
Multiplying the first of the two equations by






Noting the reduced—form relationship
1
= xY+ Z6+ l—c 1—as
The results in this appendix alsoappear in ?urray
(1978). I am grateful to Matthew Butlin forbringing
this reference to my attention.
:4.3and substituting it into the expression forctOLS, we
obtain
"OLS a_
(l—a)[(Z! + u' + v?)(I —X(XIX)'XT)(z+ u + v)]
('z' + u' +v')(I—X(X'Xr'x')u
Fromthis expressidn, we seethat if E[u'v =0,,
plim (aQLS —a)=
T
[22 ++ plimT'z'(I —X(XTX)lXT)Z&](l_a)2 U V T
(1 —c)t3
—1
1 + (c2/G2) + plimZ'(I —X(XIX)X')Z V U TcU
Thecalculation impliesthatthe bias from OLS
estimation will be greater the greater isand the
smalleris it will be smaJ.ler whentheZ's are
orthogonal to the X's. In the context of the two—
equationmodel of sterilization and offsetting capital
flows,the expression implies that the bias will be
great when the unexplained component of the capital—
flow equation is large, and whentheunexplained corn-.
ponent ofthereaction function is small. It will also
be great when the capital—flow equation is weakly iden-
tified, so that the Z's are collinear withtheX's.
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Appendix IIi: Notes on the Data
This appendix describes the.. data series underlying
the estimates presented in this essay. We employ the
following abbreviations:
MRDB =MonthlyReport of the Deutsche Bundesbank
BEQB =Bankof England Quarterly Bulletin
IFS =InternationalMonetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics
Data from the Deutsche Bundesbank's data bank
were kindly made available by Professor Manfred J.r4.
Neumann, Free University, Berlin. The generosity of
Professor Richard C. Marston, University of Pennsyl—
vania, who also shared his data with me, is acknowledged
as well.
The data series are in alphabetical order.
B: End of quarter monetary base (billions of DM). The
series was constructed by cumulating the sum of the
current account, the capital account, and thechange in
the Bundesbank's net domestic assets (i.e.,CAB, TCF,
and LDACB below) on a benchmark figure of DM 29.9billion
for 1959:IV taken from the IFS 1973 Annual Supplement.
BA: End of quarter monetary base, adjusted forreserve—
requirement changes (billions of DM). Calculatedas GB,
where e Is the base—year average reserverequirementLi.6
(.089for 1959:IV) divided bythe contemporaneous
average reserverequirement.
CAB. Current accountbalance plus balanceof official
capItal flows (billionsof DM). Deutsche Bundesbank
databank.
CABLTC: CABplus balance of private 'ong—term capital
flows(billiOnSof DM).DeutscheBundesbaflk.
fi: BundeSbaflkdIscoUntrate at end of quarter,in per
cent Derannum.MRDB.
LDACB: Change in the netdomestic assets of the Bundes—
bank (billions of DM).Deutsche Bundesbaflk.
tFACB: Change in the netforeign assets of the Bundes—
bank (billions of DM).Caiculated as CAB +TCF.
GOVDEP: Public authority depositswith Bundebaflk
(billions of DM). Source:NRDB.
GOVMON Public authority holdingsof money M2(billions
of DM). Source: MRDB.
11P:Increase lfl the domestic sourcecomponents of the
monetary base, including changesin required reserves
(billions of DM).When calculated in the mannerof
Porter (1972), this is justthe increase in the net
domestic assets of theBundesbank plus reserves liber—L.7
atedby changes in average reserve requirements. The
series used in Section IV is the same as the one used
in Neumann (1978); data come from the Deutsche Bundes—
bank.
N: End of quarter money stock (billions of DM), cal-
culated as the sum of currency In circulation plus
demand deposits plus time deposits. Source: IFS 1973
Annual Supplement.
NEL: Private net external liabilities at end of quarter
(billions of DM), calculated by cumulating TCF on a
benchmark figure for 1965:IV. The benchmark was cal-
culated as the sum of net external liabilities of banks
(NRDB, November 1967) and 700 firms surveyed by the
Bundesbank (MRDB, November 1966).
0:Percentage change over previous quarter inindex of
domesticmanufacturing orders. Source: OECD Historical
Statistics.
P: Consumer price index, 1963 =1.Source: IFS 1973
Annual Supplement.
P: Percentage change over previous quarter in industrial
wholesale price index. Source: IFS 1973 Annual Supple-
ment.
r: Three—month German interbank rate, in percent perannum, calculated as the average of weekly rates during
the last month of the quarter. Source: MRDB.
r :Three-month Eurodollar interest rate In London,
in percent per annum, calculated as the average of
weekly rates during the last month of the quarter.
Source: BEQB.
Sl,S1T:Seasonal dummies equalling 1 in the first and
fourth quarters, respectively, and0in other quarters.
SPEC1: Dummy variable to capture the effect of specu-
lation on D-Mark revaluation on the capital account.
SPEC1 equals 1 in 1961:11, —l in 1961:111, and 0 in
other quarters.
SPEC2: Speculative dummy equalling 1 in 1968:IV and
—l in1969:1.
SPEC3: Speculative dummyequalling 1in 1969:11 and
1969:111 and —1 in 1969:IV.
STCF: Short—term private capital flows, in billions of
DM.Source:Deutsche Bundesbarik.
SWP:Bundesbank swap commitments, atend of quarter
(billionsofDM). Data before l963:IV come from a graph
on page 16 of the Bundesbank's Annual Reportfor 1962.
Thereafter, data come from MRDBandits supplement on
L.3balance—of—payments statistics.
TCF: Total private capital flows (billions of DM).
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank.
0: Base adjustment factor, calculated as base—year aver-
age reserve requirements (0.089 in l959:IV) divided
by current average reserve requiremeiits. Source: MRDB
Table II.5.(b) (Table IV.3.(b) after 1968).
V: German end of quarter financial wealth (billions of
DM). Calculated as D +NEL+FACB—GOVDEP—GOVMON,
where D is indebtedness of the public authorities (in-
cluding indebtedness to the Bundesbank). D was taken
from NRDB Table VII.5 after 1965:IV. Data for 1960:1
to 1965:111 were obtained by interpolating the annual
data given in the articles 'Recent Trends in Public
Debt' (MRDB, August 1970, p. 17), and 'Indebtedness of
Public Budgets' (NRDB, April 1967, p. 25). FACB was
'obtained by cumulating LFACB on the benchmark figure
for 1959:IV of DM22.688billion, taken from MRDB.
Y: Gross national product at annual rate (billions of
DM). Figures for 1960:1 to 1961:IV are from IFS. Sub—
seouent data are taken from OECD Historical Statistics,
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